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Abstract
International integration in capital markets raises the cost of capital in technology-backward countries,
pushing them toward specialization in labor-intensive industries. To avoid specialization and to sustain
production of capital-intensive industries, governments either impose tariﬀso rl i m i tt h ed e g r e eo fc a p i t a l
market integration. The idea that trade and capital market distortions are substitutes is apparently
contradicted by the empirical evidence, that shows that countries with more open trade regimes are also
more integrated to world capital markets. However, after controlling for international productivity and
factor endowment diﬀerences, I ﬁnd a negative association between trade and capital market integration,
as predicted by the model.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why are some countries more open than others? Why do trade openness and the degree of capital market
integration diﬀer so much across countries? On the trade side, three main lines of reasoning have been
developed to explain the level and sectoral distribution of tariﬀs: the optimal tariﬀ argument (Johnson,
1965), tariﬀs as second-best or third-best policies to correct for market ineﬃciencies (Bhagwati, 1971), and
political economy explanations of the distribution of protection across sectors (Grossman and Helpman,
1995). On the ﬁnancial side, the literature highlights consumption smoothing and risk sharing as the key
beneﬁts of capital market integration. However, the optimal degree of ﬁnancial openness may also depend
on the eﬀects of capital ﬂows on monetary policy and ﬁnancial repression (McKinnon, 1973; Taylor, 1983);
on exchange rate policy and currency crises (Tobin, 1978); on increased bank fragility (Detragiache, 2001);
and output costs of sudden stops (Calvo, 1998; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004), among others.
Surprisingly few eﬀorts have been made to develop an integrated approach to understand trade and
capital market integration, though there are, of course, exceptions. Beginning with Mundell (1957), a
now vast literature discusses whether goods and factor ﬂows are complements or substitutes. A separate
literature considers the optimal "sequencing" of trade and capital account openness (McKinnon, 1982, 1991;
Edwards, 1984, 1989; Edwards and van Wijnbergen; 1986). Other authors have analyzed the role of trade
and ﬁnancial integration in macroeconomic volatility (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992, 1994; Razin and
Rose, 1994).
More recently, Aizenman in a series of papers (2003; 2004) has argued that the degree of ﬁnancial and
trade opening may be determined by public ﬁnance considerations. Developing countries, characterized
by high costs of tax collection, may opt to use ﬁnancial repression as an implicit tax on savings, providing
a motivation for capital ﬂight. Trade openness limits the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial controls as an implicit
tax on savings. Therefore, commercially open countries rationally choose a tax structure that relies less of
ﬁnancial repression: trade openness provides a stimulus to ﬁnancial openness.
The idea that countries more integrated to world capital markets have also more open trade regimes
2ﬁnds strong support in the data. Figure 1 presents evidence on this. Panel A plots a traditional measure
of trade integration −e x p o r t sp l u si m p o r t so v e rG D P − against gross private capital ﬂows over GDP, also a
commonly used measure of the degree of capital market integration (Wei and Wu, 2002; Prasad et al, 2003)
for 141 countries in 1996. Both series are from World Development Indicators. The positive and signiﬁcant
correlation reveals that countries with more open trade regimes are also countries more integrated to world
capital market. Panel B shows the same evidence for a restricted sample of 41 countries. This restricted
sample −that constitutes the basis of the empirical analysis performed below− comprises countries with data
on sector-speciﬁc factor shares for all 28 3-digit ISIC industries in 1996.
[Insert Figure 1, Panels A and B]
In apparent contradiction with this evidence, the central argument of the paper is that trade and capital
market integration are substitutes rather than complements. In particular, the paper argues that trade
and capital market distortions are alternative means for protecting non-competitive industries: the former
aﬀecting relative product prices and the latter distorting relative factor prices. However, the negative
association between trade and capital market openness arises after controlling for productivity and factor
endowment diﬀerences.
International diﬀerences in the degree of integration are held to depend on two factors. First, I assume
that there are cross-country diﬀerences in technologies, meaning that without factor mobility technology-
backward countries have both a low wage rate and a low return to capital while the opposite happens in
technology-advanced countries.1 In this scenario, capital market integration raises the return to capital
in technology-backward countries, rendering the capital-intensive industry uncompetitive and bringing the
economy toward specialization in the labor-intensive sector.
This gives rise to the second building block of the analysis. Although specialization may be welfare
improving −as is the case in this paper− I assume governments in technology-backward countries want
to avoid the disappearance of the capital-intensive industry. I do not focus on the reasons behind this
1See Treﬂer (1993) for empirical evidence on international productivity and factor-price diﬀerences. See also Prescott (1998),
Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2004).
3strategy but rather on its consequences. To avoid specialization, governments can distort product and/or
capital markets, introducing a wedge between international and domestic product prices and between the
international and domestic return to capital.2
There are however inﬁnite combinations of product and capital market distortions consistent with pro-
duction of the non-competitive sector. Naturally, each combination will have a diﬀerent eﬀect on domestic
wages, income and welfare. I assume policy makers choose the combination of trade and capital market
interventions that maximizes real per capita income. Constrained per capita income maximization3 yields
an optimal level of trade and capital market openness in which they are alternative means of compensating
domestic ﬁrms for their technological disadvantages relative to international competitors.
The trade-oﬀ faced by the policy maker is that a higher degree of capital market integration increases
the cost disadvantage for the capital-intensive industry in the technology-backward country, raising the
tariﬀ rate required to sustain its production. Capital market integration increases nominal income both
because a rise in the relative cost of capital unambiguously beneﬁts countries that are more capital abundant
than the capital requirement in the labor-intensive industry and also because it leads to a fall in technology
diﬀerences, that have an endogenous component. However, as long as the rise in the cost of capital dominates
the productivity gain eﬀect, capital market integration leads to a rise in the tariﬀ rate required to sustain the
capital-intensive industry, generating a fall in real income. The relative strength of both eﬀects determines
the degree of trade and capital market integration chosen by a country, which depend upon international
diﬀerences in factor endowment and technology.
The empirical part of the paper has two objectives. I ﬁrst check whether after controlling for international
productivity diﬀerences, trade and capital market distortions are substitutes. I ﬁnd strong support for this.
However, further conditions are necessary to make the model consistent with an unconditional positive
2As in Aizenman (2004), capital market distortions sustain a lower domestic return to capital relative to the international
rental rate.
3Constrained maximization is emphasized to remind the reader that the government’s decision is constrained by the need
to ensure production diversiﬁcation. As mentioned in the text, the ﬁrst best is accomplished with full product and capital
markets integration and hence with production specialization.
4correlation between trade and capital market integration. The second empirical exercise provides evidence
that these conditions are plausible, revealing that the evidence that countries with more integrated trade
regimes have also higher degrees of ﬁnancial openness is consistent with the idea that trade and capital
market distortions are substitutes.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that in this paper international capital market integration does not
play its traditional role of insurance against idiosyncratic shocks: there is neither uncertainty nor consump-
tion smoothing in the model. In this paper, integration in capital markets’ encourages specialization that is
welfare enhancing (Krugman, 1993). Governments intervene in product and capital markets to avoid such
specialization, keeping a diversiﬁed product mix.
The paper is divided as follows. Next section presents the model. Section 3 is empirical, and it is
divided into three parts. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 develop and estimate a methodology to measure cross-country
diﬀerences in capital returns and technologies, that is applied to a sample of 40 developed and developing
countries in 1996 across 28 3-digit ISIC manufacturing industries. I use these results to check the empirical
validity of the model in section 3.3. Section 4 presents the conclusions.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy that faces world product prices for the only two goods in this world: x and
y. Both products are produced with CRS Leontief technologies using labor L and capital K. Product x
is labor-intensive, meaning that kx <k y,w h e r eki represents the technologically-determined capital-labor
ratio in sector i. I also assume that kx <k c <k y where kc(= K/L)c represents relative factor abundance
in country c, meaning that without factor mobility both goods are produced.4
4The Leontief technology does not aﬀect any of the results. It only avoids dealing with second order eﬀects of changes in
factor intensities following changes in relative factor prices that result from variations in the degree of capital market integration.
The assumption would be however more restrictive if the pre-integration equilibrium −without international factor mobility−
were characterized by production specialization. Appendix 1 presents and discusses a graphical representation of the eﬀects of
i n t e g r a t i o ni ns u c hc a s e .
5The zero proﬁt condition in industry i in country c − that must hold for positive domestic production of






i is the international price of good i and ac
Fi measures the requirement of factor F = L,K to
produce one unit of good i. Finally, wc and rc refer to the domestic return to labor and capital respectively.
I assume that the productivity parameter a diﬀers across countries, meaning that there are cross-country
technology diﬀerences. In particular, ac
Fi/a∗
Fi =( 1+δ) ≥ 0, where δ measures the country-speciﬁcH i c k s -
neutral technology gap between country c a n daf o r e i g nc o u n t r yd e n o t e db y∗ where the international return
to capital is set. As a ﬁrst approximation, I assume that δ is exogenously determined, but this restrictive
assumption is relaxed later on. The assumption that δ>0 means that country c is technology backward
relative to the foreign economy as it requires more inputs per unit of output than the foreign economy in
both industries.
The graphical representation of the initial equilibrium with no international mobility of labor and capital
is shown in the traditional Lerner-Pearce diagram in Figure 2, that depicts unit-value isoquants of goods
x and y for the technology-backward domestic economy (continuous lines) and the technology-advanced
country (dotted lines). If relative factor endowment k belongs to the cone of diversiﬁcation kxky,b o t h
tradable goods are produced, and domestic factor prices are given by rc
a and wc
a,w h e r e(rc
a/r∗)=( wc
a/w∗)
=1 /(1 + δ) < 1.
[Insert Figure 2]
Integration of c to world capital markets leads to a rise in the domestic return to capital −that converges
to r∗− and a fall in domestic wages to w1, rendering the capital-intensive industry y uncompetitive. As a
consequence, the internationally immobile factor −labor− faces all the burden of the technology gap, and
the domestic labor market clears with capital outﬂows equal to kk1.
To avoid specialization in the labor-intensive industry, countries introduce distortions in product and/or
capital markets. As will become clear below, the ﬁrst best is always to embrace full integration to the world
6economy, meaning that welfare is maximized with full capital market integration and no tariﬀs. I assume
this option is not available, meaning that governments protect uncompetitive industries. For that, they can
introduce trade or capital market distortions. Speciﬁcally, countries can impose a tariﬀ on imports of good
y such the product price faced by domestic producers rises above the international price to a level consistent
with zero-proﬁts. In this case, the tariﬀ shifts the domestic unit-value isoquant of good y toward the origin
until point A.
Alternatively, policy makers can limit the degree of capital market integration, introducing a wedge
between the domestic and international capital return. Capital market distortions limit the convergence
of the domestic return to capital to r∗, damping the cost eﬀect on domestic producers in the capital-
intensive industry. Graphically, capital market distortions shift the new domestic unit-value isocost line
clockwise around point B until the autarky equilibrium is reached. Of course, combinations of product and
capital market distortions are also consistent with production diversiﬁcation, and each one yields a diﬀerent
equilibrium level of domestic wages and welfare.
Following Harberger (1980), the degree of capital market integration of a country is measured as the
policy-driven ratio between the domestic return to capital and the international return λ
c = rc/r∗.A
country is considered relatively integrated to world capital markets if its domestic return to capital is similar
to the international return; while a country is poorly integrated to world capital markets if there is a
signiﬁcant gap between the domestic capital return and r∗. This approach to measuring capital market
integration using price-based measures contrasts to the quantity approach followed by Feldstein and Horioka
(1980), who studied capital market integration looking at correlations between saving and investment. In
the context of this paper, a price-based approach is more meaningful because it provides a direct measure of
the impact of capital market distortions on relative costs of domestic producers vis-à-vis foreign competitors.
Before proceeding, I extend the framework to allow for endogenous technology diﬀerences. In particular,
I assume that cross-country productivity diﬀerences have a country-speciﬁc exogenous component and an
endogenous policy-driven component that depends upon the degree of integration of each country to world
capital markets. Speciﬁcally, I assume that (1 + δ
c)=bc · f (λ
c) where bc ≥ 1 measures the country-
7speciﬁc exogenous component of technology diﬀerences. Function f(λ) is continuous and strictly convex,
meaning that the technology gap decreases the more ﬁnancially integrated the domestic country is.5 Also,
f (1) = 1, meaning that with full capital market integration international productivity diﬀerences are given
by bc and f0(1) = 0,s ot h a ta sλ approaches 1 there are no productivity gains of further capital market
integration. The productivity gap between any country and the foreign economy is therefore bounded
between bf(λa) > (1 + δ) >b>1. (Hereafter I eliminate the superscript c unless needed for presentation
purposes.)
Because technology diﬀerences depend upon the policy-determined degree of capital market integration
λ, the autarky situation represents an equilibrium where the policy maker chooses a degree of capital market


















Fi is the share of factor F in value-added in industry i in the foreign country and γa = wa/w∗.6
The solution to (2) and (3) is λa = γa such that λa =[ bf (λa)]
−1 =( 1+δa)
−1 < 1. It is straightforward
to check that the sign of ∂λa/∂b depends upon the sign of ∂ (λf)/∂λ =( f + λf0).I f f + λf0 > 0,
technology-backward high−b c o u n t r i e sh a v el o w e ra u t a r k yf a c t o rp r i c e s . Ia s s u m et h i si st h ec a s e .
Starting from the autarky equilibrium, integration into world capital markets brings the domestic return
to capital to the international level. Because labor is internationally immobile, the rise in the relative cost
of capital renders domestic producers uncompetitive in the capital-intensive industry. Therefore, the post-
integration zero-proﬁt conditions in both sectors can be expressed as (for analytical simplicity I hereafter
5Because equilibrium tariﬀs τ and the degree of capital market integration λ are tightly linked, (1 + δ)=f(λ) may be
derived from a more general speciﬁcation (1 + δ)=f(λ,τ) where τ = g(λ) is the equilibrium tariﬀ rate on the importing sector.
6Equations (2) and (3) assume that τ∗
x = τ∗


















w∗ +( 1− θ)λ
i
(5)
T h ed o m e s t i ct a r i ﬀ rate in industry y is denoted by τ and it measures the degree of product market
distortions, and the level of capital market distortions is reﬂected in the policy-driven ratio of domestic to
f o r e i g nr e t u r nt oc a p i t a lλ = r/r∗. It is evident that with full product and capital market integration,
i.e., τ =0and λ =1 , equation (5) does not hold, revealing that the capital-intensive industry y is not
competitive, and its production must be supported with trade and/or capital market distortions. This is
of course not the case if the country chooses its autarky equilibrium, with λ = λa and τ =0 ,i nw h i c hc a s e
both (4) and (5) hold.
There are however inﬁnite combinations {τ,λ} that are consistent with positive production of both goods,
and each one yields a diﬀerent level of domestic wages and welfare. In particular, each pair {τ,λ} satisﬁes
(1 + τ)=
θ +( 1− 2θ)λ(1 + δ)
1 − θ
=
θ +( 1− 2θ)λbf (λ)
1 − θ
(6)
where ∂ (1 + τ)/∂λ =[ ( 1− 2θ)/(1 − θ)]·b·(f + λf0) > 0. Deeper capital market integration (a higher
λ)h a st w oe ﬀects on equilibrium tariﬀs. A direct impact follows from the increase in production costs for
domestic producers relative to foreign ones in the capital-intensive industry y that results from the raise
in the relative cost of capital at any given level of b. Therefore, higher tariﬀs are required to support the
uncompetitive sector. However, a raise in λ also generates a fall in the technology gap (f0 < 0). Although
the fall in δ raises domestic wages and hence production costs in sector y,t h i se ﬀects is unambiguously
dominated by the productivity gain in that industry, meaning that the cost gap between domestic and
foreign producers fall, and so does the tariﬀ rate that supports industry y. I denote this the indirect eﬀect.
Because (f + λf0) > 0, the direct eﬀect always dominates, meaning that there is a positive association
7Recall that x is the labor-intensive industry.
9between τ and λ: a high degree of capital market integration must be accompanied with a low degree of
trade integration in order to compensate the cost disadvantage of domestic ﬁrms in the capital-intensive
industry. Therefore, trade and capital market distortions are substitutes.
From all possible combinations of {τ,λ} I assume the policy maker chooses the one that maximizes
welfare of the representative consumer of the domestic economy. Assuming a log-linear utility function
where α represents the share of consumption of good y in income, welfare can be expressed as an increasing








y is the relevant price index. From (4) and (5) we can express domestic
real income per capita as R =( λr∗k + w(λ))/P(λ),w h e r e∂w/∂λ < 0 and ∂P/∂λ = ∂P/∂τ · ∂τ/∂λ > 0.
Intuitively, the decision on λ aﬀects nominal income because of its direct impact on factor rewards and
indirectly through its productivity eﬀect. Also, λ aﬀects real income through its impact on tariﬀs, as
d e s c r i b e di ne q u a t i o n( 6 ) .
The maximization problem of the policy maker can be written as
max
λ
lnU =l nC +l nI − αln(1 + τ)=
max
λ















where C is a combination of parameters that do not vary with λ. The range for possible values for
λ is determined by several conditions. First, λ has to be greater than its autarky level λa.O t h e r w i s e ,
equilibrium tariﬀs are negative. Second, the upper limit for λ is determined by two conditions. On the
one hand, λ cannot be higher than 1, meaning that the maximum domestic return to capital is r∗.O n
the other hand, the degree of capital market integration has to be such that domestic wages are positive,
restricting λ to be such that λf(λ) < 1/bθ. Intuitively, if technology diﬀerences are large enough, a high
degree of capital market integration might require negative domestic wages for the zero-proﬁt condition in
labor-intensive industry x to hold. For simplicity, and without any loss of generality, I assume that bc < 1/θ
for all c, meaning that for all countries λa ≤ λ ≤ 1.
The optimal value for λ is obtained by solving the ﬁrst order condition of problem (7), that is ∂ lnI/∂λ =


















(f + λf0) > 0. (9)
where F =( ( r∗k/w∗)(1− θ) − θ) ∈ (0,G) and G =( 1− 2θ)/θ.8
An increase in λ raises nominal income (I(λ) > 0) through two channels. First, the fall in w/r following
ar a i s ei nλ increases income because the capital-labor endowment is higher than the capital-labor ratio in
the labor-intensive industry (k>k x). Second, income increases because technology diﬀerences fall with
λ. The intuition for T(λ) > 0 emphasizes the substitution between trade and capital market integration: a
raise in λ rises equilibrium tariﬀs because the direct impact of a higher cost of capital dominates the indirect
impact on production costs of a lower productivity gap between domestic and foreign producers of good y.9




the corresponding equilibrium level of tariﬀs,
it is straightforward to check that the ﬁrst best is to embrace full product and capital market integration,
and specialize in the production of the labor-intensive good, i.e., U(λ =1 ,τ =0 )>U(λ = e λ,τ = e τ).W i t h
complete international integration (λ =1and τ =0 ), the second term in the right-hand-side of (7) reaches
its maximum value (see (8)), and the last term its minimum. Any policy to protect the uncompetitive
labor-intensive industry therefore yields a lower welfare level.
To characterize the equilibrium level of capital market integration e λ we analyze the continuous function
H(λ)=I(λ)−T(λ). For simplicity I assume that α → 1, meaning that the share of the capital-intensive good
in consumption approaches 1. None of the conclusions of the paper rests on this simplifying assumption.
A unique interior maximum exists if ∂H(λ)/∂λ < 0, H(1) < 0 and H(λa) > 0. A necessary condition for
∂H(λ)/∂λ < 0 is that 2(f0)
2 − ff00 < 0,m e a n i n gt h a tf(λ) must be suﬃciently convex.10 If f00 > 0 the
8The assumption that kx <k<k y assures that r∗k/w∗ ∈ (θ/(1 − θ),(1 − θ)/θ).
9Notice the relevance of f + λf0 > 0.I f f + λf0 < 0,i ti sa l w a y st h ec a s et h a tI(λ) > 0 and T(λ) < 0,w h i c hm e a n st h a t
an interior solution is never reached.






, which implies that a necessary condition for a
11rate at which international productivity diﬀerences shrink with capital market integration decrease with λ.
For f00 suﬃciently high, the rate at which nominal income increases with λ is negatively aﬀected relative to
t h er a t ea tw h i c ht a r i ﬀs rise with λ.A l s o , H(1) is always negative because G>F, meaning that the upper
bound for e λ is never binding.11




λ=λa > (G−F)/(G−F +(1+G)(1+F)).T h e l e f t -
hand-side term is an increasing function of b, meaning that this condition is more likely for high−b countries.
Ar i s ei nb decreases λa and, although we have not said anything regarding the sign of ∂e λ/∂b, we know that
e λ either increases with b or it decreases at a smaller rate than λa (∂e λ/∂b > ∂λa/∂b = −λf/b(f +λf0)). The
right-hand-side term is a decreasing function of k, revealing that capital-abundant countries are more likely to
have an interior solution with e λ>λ a.B e c a u s e λa does not depend on k, the higher gains of capital market
integration in capital-abundant countries unambiguously enhance the likelihood of an interior solution in
high−k economies. Graphically, Figure 3 depicts H(λ) against λ in two scenarios. In panel (a), an interior
is reached with λa < e λ<1 while in panel (b) the economy chooses its autarky equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 3]
Before proceeding, notice the relevance of allowing for an endogenous component of productivity diﬀer-
ences. If technology diﬀerences were totally exogenous, i.e., f(λ)=1 ,t h e nT(λ)=Gb/(1 + Gbλ) and
I(λ)=Fb/(1+Fbλ). If the conditions for an interior solution are satisﬁed, i.e., 1/b = λa < e λ<1,t h es o l u -
tion is a minimum, meaning that a corner solution is always reached.12 For α suﬃciently high (α>F/ G ),
the economy chooses its autarky equilibrium (λ = λa =1 /b and τ =0 ), as the price costs of higher tariﬀs
in response to capital market integration always dominate the income gains. Conversely, if α<F / Gthe
economy chooses full capital market integration (λ =1and τ =( 1− 2θ)(b − 1)/(1 − θ) > 0), revealing that
the cost of higher prices is irrelevant if the share of the capital-intensive good in aggregate consumption is
∂H(λ)/∂λ < 0 is 2(f0)2 <ff 00.
11T(1) = Gb
1+Gb > Fb
1+Fb = I(1) as G>F.
12The optimal degree of capital market integration is given by e λ = αG−F




G(1+bF). However, this is always a minimum.
12too small.
Back to the case in which technology diﬀerences have an endogenous component, we know proceed to
analyze how e λ varies with k and b?C o n s i d e r ﬁrst the eﬀect on the equilibrium level of capital market
integration of diﬀerences in k. It is straightforward to see that ∂H(λ)/∂k > 0.T h e ﬁnal eﬀect on λ
depends upon whether λa is binding or not. If an interior solution is reached, increases in k enhance the
gains from capital market integration for all λ.B e c a u s e d i ﬀerences in k only aﬀect τ through its eﬀect on













For a given b, capital-abundant countries choose higher degrees of capital market integration and, as a
consequence, they also choose lower degrees of product market integration (high e τ) in response to the greater
cost disadvantage in industry y.O t h e r w i s e , i f b and k are such that a corner solution is reached, marginal
changes in k neither aﬀect λ nor τ.
Diﬀerences in b aﬀect H(λ) through two mechanisms. A raise in b rises the marginal income gains of
capital market integration: ∂I(λ)/∂b > 0. This is because the productivity gains following a marginal rise in
λ are greater in technology-backward countries, i.e., ∂2 (1 + δ)/∂λ∂b = f0 < 0. However, the marginal eﬀect
on equilibrium tariﬀs of capital market integration is also greater in technology-backward countries, meaning
that ∂T(λ)/∂b > 0. The direct impact on tariﬀs of deeper capital market integration −that increases with
b− dominates the higher productivity gains that are also greater in high−b countries. Analytically,
∂H(λ)
∂b
=( f + λf0) ·
·
F





The eﬀect of diﬀerences in b on e λ will depend upon the sign of (10). If ∂H(λ)/∂b < 0 the tariﬀ eﬀect
dominates the income eﬀect, and technology-backward countries choose a lower degree of capital market
integration, i.e., ∂e λ/∂b < 0. The opposite happens if ∂H(λ)/∂b > 0.
The condition for ∂H(λ)/∂b < 0 is FG(bλf)2
λ=e λ < 1. Although we cannot get an analytical solution
for e λ, we can characterize this condition by focusing on extreme values. Notice ﬁrst that 1 ≤ bλf ≤ b,
which means that FGb2 < 1 is a suﬃcient condition for ∂H(λ)/∂b < 0. Second, because b<1/θ,
13G =( 1− 2θ)/θ and F ∈ (0,G),as u ﬃcient condition for FGb2 < 1 is that (1 − 2θ)
2 <θ
4, which holds
if θ>. 41.A s k falls, the minimum value for θ consistent with ∂H(λ)/∂b < 0 falls, and it converges
to zero as F → 0. Alternatively, as b approaches 1 and F = G, ∂e λ/∂b is negative if θ>1/3,a n dt h i s
value decreases as the country becomes more labor-abundant. Therefore, unless θ is suﬃciently small,
technology-backward countries choose lower degrees of capital market integration, meaning that the price
costs of greater technology backwardness dominate the income gains due to greater productivity.




follows from noticing that this expression deﬁnes
a negatively sloped threshold in the plane (b,k) below which FGb2 < 1. This condition is more likely to
hold if technology-backward high−b countries are also low−F labor-abundant economies. This association
between b and k need not be a structural relationship −indeed; the model is silent about it− but rather an
empirical regularity.
The sign of ∂e λ/∂b is relevant for two reasons. Its ﬁrst implication is related to the eﬀect that changes
in b have on equilibrium tariﬀs. Totally diﬀerentiating (6) yields












Changes in b have two eﬀects on tariﬀs. A direct eﬀect is reﬂected in the ﬁr s tt e r mi ns q u a r eb r a c k e t s ,
which shows that a rise in b must be accompanied by a rise in tariﬀs at any given level of λ because the
cost disadvantage of domestic producers increases. The right-hand-side term inside the square parenthesis
reﬂects the indirect impact that changes in b have on tariﬀs through changes in the degree of capital market
integration. If ∂e λ/∂b < 0 ar i s ei nb generates a fall in the level of capital market integration, pressuring
tariﬀs downward. The opposite happens if ∂e λ/∂b > 0. However, we know that ∂e λ/∂b > −λf/b(f + λf0),
which means that ∂(1+e τ)/∂b > 0, meaning that the direct eﬀect always dominate the indirect one regardless
on the sign of ∂e λ/∂b. Therefore, technology-backward countries have higher tariﬀs.
The sign of ∂e λ/∂b is also crucial to obtain predictions with regard to the association between trade and
capital market integration. Although to sign ∂e λ/∂b we need to specify a particular functional form for f,t h e
model is general enough to predict diﬀerent unconditional relationships between trade and capital market
14openness for alternative values of the parameters. To check this, it is useful to summarize the predictions
of the model in the following way


























(f + λf0)(G − F)
















where (∂H(λ)/∂λ)λ=e λ < 0.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which countries only diﬀer in their relative factor endowment k. Capital
abundant countries unambiguously choose higher degrees of capital market integration (high λ)a n dh a v e
higher tariﬀs. As discussed above, a high capital-labor endowment enhances the income gains of capital
market integration at the cost of raising the tariﬀ requirement for the uncompetitive industry. Therefore,
the model predicts a positive correlation between e λ and e τ,m e a n i n gt h a tﬁnancially integrated countries will
have more closed trade regimes
³







Alternatively, suppose that countries only diﬀer in their exogenous technological component b. Because
∂ (1 + e τ)/∂b > 0, the correlation between trade and capital market integration depends solely on the sign of
∂e λ/∂b.I f ∂e λ/∂b > 0 countries with more open ﬁnancial regimes −that happen to be technology backward−
are less integrated to world product markets, both due to the higher technological gap and also because
the cost of capital is higher. Conversely, if ∂e λ/∂b < 0 technology-backward countries choose lower degrees
of capital market integration, and a positive association between trade and capital market openness arises
³






. As discussed above, this condition is more likely if there is
a negative association between capital intensity and technology levels, meaning that technology-backward
countries are also labor abundant.
Finally, assume that there are international diﬀerences both in b and k.E v e n i f ∂e λ/∂b > 0, the model is
capable of delivering a negative unconditional correlation between λ and τ if b and k are negatively correlated.
In particular, it is possible that high−k low−b countries choose higher degrees of capital market integration,
15because the eﬀect of diﬀerences in factor endowments on the degree of capital market integration dominates
the eﬀect of productivity diﬀerences. Also, if tariﬀ diﬀerences are dominated by productivity diﬀerences
rather than diﬀerences in capital market integration, labor-abundant technology-backward countries choose
low degrees of capital and product market integration, while the opposite happens to capital abundant
technology-advanced countries, meaning that ﬁnancially open countries have also more open trade regimes.
Notice that the possibility that the model delivers a positive unconditional correlation between trade and
capital market integration is not contradictory with the idea that capital market distortions are substitutes of
trade distortions. It just emphasizes the relevance of controlling for cross-country diﬀerences in technology
and factor endowments. This is exactly the objective of the empirical section, which is divided into three
parts. First, I develop a methodology to estimate cross-country diﬀerences in factor returns, that are
used as measures of capital market integration. Second, I use these estimates to calculate international
productivity diﬀerences. Finally, I test two implications of the model. First, I test whether after correcting
for productivity diﬀerences; trade and capital market distortions are substitutes, as emphasized in the model.
Second, I analyze the plausibility of the conditions that allow the model to deliver a positive unconditional
correlation between trade and capital market integration.
3 Empirical Estimation
3.1 International Factor Price Diﬀerences
Using the notation of section 2, the zero-proﬁt condition for any domestic ﬁrm in sector i is
pi = aHiwH + aKir. (13)
where aHi is the inverse of average human capital productivity (H = L · h where L is the number of
workers and h is the average quality of workers) in industry i and wH is the return per eﬃciency unit of
labor. I explicitly consider eﬃciency units of labor (eﬀective labor) rather than number of workers to obtain
estimates of productivity and factor price diﬀerences that do not reﬂect diﬀerences in labor quality. For
16space considerations I do not report the results of the estimations assuming h =1(that are available upon
request to the author), but all the results that follow do not depend upon the speciﬁc measure of labor input
used.13
The ratio of average eﬀective labor and capital productivity between domestic and foreign ﬁrms in any






























Assuming Hicks-neutral technology diﬀerences and controlling for cross-country diﬀerences in relative
factor prices, a second order Taylor approximation of a foreign ﬁrm isoquant around the foreign country




















































where ω =( wH/r)/(w∗
H/r∗) is the ratio of relative factor prices between the domestic and foreign
economies and σi is the sector-speciﬁc elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Combining both
expressions we get ³
1 − θ
∗


























Hi). Equation (17) is a non-linear equation on ω. Assuming equalization
of relative factor prices across industries within each country, we can estimate (17) to obtain the value of ω
consistent with cross-country cross-industry diﬀerences in average factor productivity using sectoral data on
factor shares and elasticities of substitution.
13Neither I correct for diﬀerences in the quality of capital, that according to Caselli (2004) could be an important source of
cross-country income diﬀerences.
14The deﬁnition of the elasticity of substitution between eﬀective labor and capital is σi =dlne ki/dln(wH/r) where e k =
K/H = k/h is capital per unit of eﬀective labor. The percentage change in aHi and aKi for changes in relative factor prices
are d aHi = −θ∗
Kiσi (ω − 1) + 1
2θ∗
Kiθ∗
Hiσi (ω − 1)2 and d aKi = θ∗
Hiσi (ω − 1) + 1
2θ∗
Kiθ∗
Hiσi (ω − 1)2, from which (15) and (16)
follow.
17Table 1 reports estimates of ω for 40 countries using the United States as the reference country.15 Data
on factor shares in 1996 are obtained from UNIDO’s Manufacturing Statistical Database at 3-digit ISIC
level16 and data on elasticities of substitution between labor and capital σi are from Claro (2003). All
estimates of σi with the exception of Tobacco industries −with an estimated value for σi =2 .12− are in the
neighborhood of 1, and the results do not change if we assume diﬀerent values for σi close to 1.
[Insert Table 1]
All values of ω are positive and half of them signiﬁcant. As expected from traditional macroeconomic
theory, capital-abundant countries have higher wage-rental rate ratios; indeed, the correlation coeﬃcient
between ωc and e kc/e k∗ = kc/k∗ · h∗/hc is .46 signiﬁcant at 1%, where kc/k∗ is the ratio of real capital per
worker between each country and the United States from Penn World Tables and h∗/hc is the ratio of a
measure of quality of labor between the U.S and each country, both from Caselli (2004).17 However, it is
not the case that capital-abundant countries have a high wage rate and a low return to capital. Using the
estimates of ω I compute the rental rate ratio r/r∗ as λ =( w/w∗) · (h∗/h)/ω where w is the wage rate per
worker measured as average yearly wages in manufacturing industries obtained from UNIDO’s Statistical
Yearbook (notice that the wage rate per eﬀective unit of labor wH is equal to w/h). The unconditional
correlation between λ and e k/e k∗ is .7, signiﬁcant at 1%, revealing that capital-abundant countries have
relatively higher capital returns.18 The evidence that most countries have low wages and low capital returns
(relative to the United States) −even after correcting for diﬀerences in labor quality− suggests the existence
of international technological diﬀerences.
Are these measures of rental rate diﬀerences reasonable? In terms of the model, λ is meant to capture
diﬀerent degrees of capital market integration. This approach is similar to Harberger’s (1980), who argued
15The values for ω are estimated assuming a starting value for ω of 1. However, none of the results depend upon the starting
value chosen for ω unless it is in the neighborhood of 8.
16The sample includes only countries for which data on factor shares are available for all 28 industries in 1996.
17The correlation coeﬃcient between ωc and kc/k∗ is .46, also highly signiﬁcant.
18The rental rate gap unconditional on international diﬀerences in human capital can be computed as (w/w∗)/ω.T h e
correlation between (w/w∗)/ω and k/k∗ is .77, signiﬁcant at 1%.
18that the degree of international capital market integration is better quantiﬁed by looking at international
factor price diﬀerences rather than international factor ﬂows (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). A comparison
with more standard measures of capital market integration −like capital ﬂo w sa ss h a r eo fG D Pr e v e a l st h a t
λ is a reasonable measure of capital market integration. Figure 4 shows a positive and signiﬁcant association
between λ
c and gross private capital ﬂows as a share of each country’s GDP in 1996.
[Insert Figure 4]
Although it is not the objective of this paper to gauge an overall degree of capital market integration,
the results in Table 1 tend to support Feldstein and Horioka’s conclusion that the degree of capital market
integration is low. This is because international rental rate diﬀerences are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 and
similar to international wage diﬀerences. Finally, Figure 5 plots average manufacturing tariﬀs( f r o mU N C -
TAD, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2001) against λ. The evidence that high-tariﬀ countries have also greater rental
rate gaps reveals that the quantity-based positive correlation between trade and capital market integration
depicted in Figure 1 also holds using price-based measures of international integration.
[Insert Figure 5]
3.2 International Technology Diﬀerences
The industry-speciﬁc Hicks-neutral technological gap between each country and the United States is esti-
mated from the zero-proﬁt conditions. Given country-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in factor-price ratios, there is a
unique level of δi that ﬁts perfectly the zero-proﬁt condition in industry i in each country. Combining (13),



























With sector-speciﬁc values of factor shares in the United States (obtained from UNIDO Statistical Data
base), labor-quality-adjusted wage data wH/w∗
H (from UNIDO and Caselli, 2004) and estimated values for
ω reported in Table 1 we can compute the value of δi that ﬁts perfectly equation (18). The results are
19reported in Table 2. The calculations assume that (1 + τi)/(1 + τ∗
i)=1to obtain measures of technology
diﬀerences that do not depend on tariﬀ diﬀerences. This is to avoid a spurious correlation between tariﬀs
and productivity diﬀerences, relationship that is exploited later on. In any case, the values of δi do not
change signiﬁcantly if we include sector− and country−speciﬁct a r i ﬀs (not reported).19
Table 2 shows sector-speciﬁc values for δ as well as a "country-speciﬁc" value for (1 + δ) computed as the
unweighted average of (1+δi). Although there are cross-industry within-country diﬀerences in productivity
gaps, it is evident that the cross-country variance is much greater. These measures are very similar to
alternative estimates of international technological diﬀerences. For example, the last two columns reports
cross-country productivity diﬀerences from Treﬂer (1995). The correlation with (1 + δ) is .82 for the neutral
model and .97 for the unrestricted model.
[Insert Table 2]
3.3 Are Product and Capital Market Distortions Substitutes?
The ﬁrst exercise is to test the idea that trade and capital market distortions are alternative means for
protecting uncompetitive sectors. According to (6), conditional on b, ∂ (1 + τ)/∂λ > 0. The estimates
of (1 + δ) reported in Table 2 combine however information on exogenous and policy-driven components of
international productivity diﬀerences, and they do not provide direct measures of b. Instead of identifying
cross-country diﬀerences in b from (1 + δ), I exploit the fact that, conditional on (1 + δ), (6) also predicts
that ∂ (1 + τ)/∂λ > 0. Controlling for (1 + δ) rather than b allows us to identify the direct eﬀect of changes
in the cost of capital on equilibrium tariﬀs without changes in the productivity gap. I therefore consider
the following speciﬁcation:
(1 + τ)=α0 + α1 · (1 + δ)+α2 · λ + α3 · λ(1 + δ)+ε (19)





=( w/w∗), i.e. not correcting for diﬀerences in human capital− also yield very similar
results. Denoting δi1 the technology gap in industry i that accounts for cross-country diﬀerences in the quality of labor and
δi2 the one that doesn´t, it follows that (1 + δi1)=( 1+δi2) · (h/h∗).
20where ε is a standard error term. From (6), I expect ∂(1+τ)/∂λ = α2 +α3 ·(1 + δ) > 0 for all possible
values of (1 + δ), meaning that tariﬀs are increasing on λ in all countries, and that this eﬀect is greater in
technology-backward countries.
Table 3 reports the results for alternative speciﬁcations of (19), that either include all countries for which
series on τ, λ and δ a r ea v a i l a b l eo rc o u n t r i e sw i t h(1 + δ) > 1, which implies b>1.I n a l l c a s e s I h a v e
excluded Egypt from the estimations due to its unusually high average tariﬀ rate, but none of the results
vary with its inclusion. The ﬁrst two regressions reﬂect the positive and signiﬁcant unconditional association
between product and capital market integration that is evident in Figure 5: countries with high tariﬀsh a v e
greater rental rate gaps (relative to the United States).
Regressions 3 and 4 impose the restriction α1 = α2 =0 , based on a literal interpretation of equation
(6).20 The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of λ(1 + δ) reveals that ∂ (1 + τ)/∂λ is signiﬁcantly greater
than zero, meaning that trade and capital market distortions are substitutes. Finally, columns 5 and 6
report the results of unrestricted estimations of (19). Using Delta Method to compute conﬁdence intervals
for α2 + α3 · (1 + δ) reveals that ∂ (1 + τ)/∂λ is positive and signiﬁcant in all countries. Figure 6 plots the




The evidence that trade and capital market integration are substitutes is not suﬃcient though to make
the model consistent with a negative unconditional correlation between λ and τ. For that, we need certain
conditions on coeﬃcients in equations (11) and (12). The rest of the section explores the plausibility of
those conditions.
20According to (6), (1 + τ)= θ
1−θ + 1−2θ
1−θ · λ(1 + δ).
21The same conclusions are obtained if the regressions are run using measures of rental rate and productivity diﬀerences that
do not correct for human capital diﬀerences. Also, similar results are obtained if we replace λ in Table 3 by Gross Private
Capital Flows as share of GDP (plotted in Figure 1, panel B).
21Consider the following structural relationship from which (11) follows: (1+τ)=β0 +β1 ·k+β2 ·b+β3 ·
k ·b+µ. The model predicts ∂(1+τ)/∂k =( β1 + β3b) > 0 and ∂(1+τ)/∂b =( β2 +β3k) > 0.A l t h o u g h b
is not observable, it can be expressed as a function of (1 + δ) and λ,w h e r eb =( 1+δ)/f (λ).I p a r t i c u l a r , I
assume b =( 1+δ)(a0λ+a1λ
2) where a0,a 1 are constants with a0 > 0 and a1 < 0.22 Plugging this function
into the equation governing (1 + τ) yields
(1 + τ)=γ0 + γ1 · k + γ2 · (1 + δ)λ + γ3 · (1 + δ)λ
2 + γ4 · k(1 + δ)λ + γ5 · k(1 + δ)λ
2 + µ (20)
where γ0 = β0, γ1 = β1, γ2 = β2a0, γ3 = β2a1, γ4 = β3a0 and γ5 = β3a1.
Table 4 reports results from diﬀerent speciﬁcations of equation (20). The ﬁrst two regressions run (1+τ)
against k. There is a signiﬁcant negative unconditional relationship between tariﬀs and capital abundance:
capital-abundant countries have lower tariﬀ rates. However, this negative association vanishes once we
control for technology diﬀerences. As shown in columns 3 and 4 −that assume β3 =0 −, controlling for b
renders γ1 insigniﬁcant, although not positive as predicted by the model. A second implication of regressions
3 and 4 follows from noticing that γ2 > 0 and γ3 < 0.B e c a u s e a0 > 0 and a1 < 0, this implies that β2 > 0
(∂(1 + τ)/∂b > 0)c o n ﬁrming that technology-backward countries have higher average tariﬀs.
[Insert Table 4]
The last four regressions include the interacted term b·k. Columns 5 and 6 report unrestricted regressions
while the last two columns report regressions with the parameter restriction γ5 = γ3γ4/γ2.23 Several conclu-
sions can be drawn from these results. Notice ﬁr s tt h a tt h es i g no f∂(1+τ)/∂k =
¡
γ1 + γ4 · (1 + δ)λ + γ5 · (1 + δ)λ
2¢
depends upon the speciﬁc values for δ and λ. W i t ht h er e s u l t si nc o l u m n5Iu s eD e l t aM e t h o dt oc o m p u t e
conﬁdence intervals of ∂(1 + τ)/∂k for each combination (δ,λ). There is no signiﬁcant association (at 95%
conﬁdence level) between factor abundance and average tariﬀs in all but two countries (Costa Rica and
Uruguay). Using the results in column 6, in only 9 out of 24 countries there is a negative and signiﬁcant
22Conditional on (1 + δ), ∂b/∂λ = −(1 + δ)f0/f2 > 0 and ∂2b/∂λ2 =( 1 + δ)/f3 · (2f0f0 − ff00) < 0. Recall that
(2f0f0 − ff00) < 0 is a necessary condition for a unique interior maximum.
23The probabilities of not rejecting the null hypothesis that γ5 = γ3γ4/γ2 in regressions 5 and 6 are .61 and .25 respectively.
22association between capital intensity and average tariﬀs. Overall, the results reveal that after correcting for
productivity diﬀerences there is no correlation between factor abundance and tariﬀs.
A second element to highlight from regressions 5 to 8 concerns the sign of ∂(1 + τ)/∂b =( β2 + β3k).
Although β2 and β3 are not observable, we know that (β2 + β3k)=( γ2 + γ4k)/a0 =( γ3 + γ5k)/a1.T h e
assumption that a0 > 0 and a1 < 0 are constant implies that the sign and signiﬁcance of ∂(1+τ)/∂b,t h o u g h
not its size, is the same as the sign and signiﬁcance of (γ2 +γ4k) and −(γ3 +γ5k).N o t i c e t h a t γ2 > 0 and
γ3 < 0,a n da l s oγ4 < 0 and γ5 > 0,r e v e a l i n gt h a tβ2 > 0 and β3 < 0. U s i n gD e l t aM e t h o dt oc o m p u t e
conﬁdence intervals for these expressions yield the following results. With regressions 5 and 6, in around 50%
of the countries ∂(1+τ)/∂b is positive and signiﬁcant while in 50% of the cases it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.24 Similar results are derived from the restricted regressions with the exception of regression 8,
in which case ∂(1 + τ)/∂b is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all countries in the restricted sample.
The evidence that ∂(1+τ)/∂b ≥ 0 does not reveal however the sign of ∂λ/∂b.I f ∂λ/∂b < 0 the model is
consistent with a negative unconditional correlation between λ and τ unless b and k are positively correlated.
Consider ﬁrst the case where cross-country diﬀerences in k are relatively unimportant. Technology-backward
countries choose lower degrees of capital market integration and have high tariﬀ rates in response to high
b,m e a n i n gt h a tﬁnancially isolated countries have more restricted trade regimes. If b and k are negatively
correlated, meaning that technology-backward economies are also labor abundant, high−b low−k countries
choose low levels of capital market integration λ and, if the technology eﬀect dominates the capital market
integration eﬀect on determining τ, they also have high tariﬀs.
The condition that b and k are negatively correlated is necessary for the model to deliver a negative
unconditional correlation between λ and τ if ∂λ/∂b > 0.I f t h e e ﬀect of a low k on λ dominates the eﬀect
of a high level of b, technology-backward labor-abundant countries choose low degrees of capital market
integration and, if the technology eﬀect dominates the capital market integration eﬀect on determining τ,
then ﬁnancially integrated countries are also trade integrated countries.
Is there direct evidence on the sign of ∂λ/∂b?A ﬁrst approach is to estimate θ from columns 3 and 4
24The only two exceptions are Canada and Hong Kong under speciﬁcation 6, where ∂ (1 + τ)/∂b is negative and signiﬁcant.
23in Table 3. According to equation (6), the coeﬃcient on (1 + δ)λ,t h a ti sa p p r o x i m a t e l y2/5,i se q u a lt o
(1 − 2θ)/(1 − θ), which yields a value of θ ≈ .45. As discussed in section 2, the condition for ∂λ/∂b < 0
is FG(bλf)
2 = FG(λ(1 + δ))
2 < 1, which always hold if θ>2/5, suggesting that technology-backward
countries choose lower degrees of capital market integration. An alternative mechanism is to compute for
each country in the sample the minimum value of θ that makes FG(λ(1 + δ))
2 smaller than 1. For that, I
assume an aggregate labor share in the United States of .7, which implies r∗k∗/w∗ =3 /7. The results reveal
that given the distribution of factor abundance and technology diﬀerences across countries, this condition
holds for all countries if θ>. 2, that is a very small value, suggesting that ∂λ/∂b < 0.
With regard to the correlation between factor abundance and productivity diﬀerences, I run the following
regression:
k
k∗ = ρ0 + ρ1 · b + υ = ρ0 + ρ1a0 (1 + δ)λ + ρ1a1 (1 + δ)λ
2 + υ.
The results, reported in Table 5, suggest that ρ1 is negative and signiﬁcant (a0 > 0 and a1 < 0), and
hence that there is a strong negative correlation between productivity diﬀerences b and relative capital-labor
ratios k/k∗. Together with the evidence that ∂λ/∂b < 0, this empirical regularity reinforces the indirect
evidence that the model is consistent with a positive unconditional correlation between trade and capital
market integration.
[Insert Table 5]
4C o n c l u s i o n
In a context where international technological diﬀerences play a crucial role in explaining international factor
price diﬀerences, trade and capital market distortions are alternative means for protecting uncompetitive
industries. If governments support uncompetitive industries with capital market distortions, limiting the
convergence of the return to capital in technology-backward countries to higher international levels, the pres-
sures for tariﬀ protection are lower. The message that trade and capital market distortions are substitutes
contrasts with the overwhelming empirical evidence that shows that ﬁnancially integrated countries are also
24countries with more open trade regimes.
The paper shows that both ideas are however not contradictory. After controlling for international
productivity diﬀerences there is a strong negative association between trade and capital market integration.
However, because countries diﬀer in their levels of technology and factor abundance, the evidence suggests
that technology-backward labor-abundant countries choose lower degrees of capital market integration and
have high tariﬀs, revealing a positive unconditional correlation between trade and capital market integration.
These results have important implications for the debate on the eﬀects of global integration for less-
developed countries. If international productivity diﬀerences are indeed a signiﬁcant determinant of cross-
country income diﬀerences, global capital market integration raises the cost of capital in technology-backward
countries, pushing technology-backward poor countries toward specialization in labor-intensive products,
unless integration is accompanied by suﬃciently high technological gains.
Although specialization is welfare improving in the long run, the shift in the production structure may
generate high cross-sector factor movements with important employment eﬀects in the short run. Accounting
for this short run reallocation costs may enlighten the discussion of why globalization has been resisted
in many countries. In a similar vein, without factor movements the costs of international productivity
diﬀerences are shared by all factors. However, global capital market integration rises the opportunity cost
for capital in technology-backward countries, hurting those factors that are internationally immobile, like
unskilled labor. In other words, the burden of productivity deﬁciencies is faced by those factors with
less international mobility (Rodrik, 1997). However, it is not globalization the fundamental cause behind
this change in relative factor prices −and eventual rise in income inequality− but rather the existence of
international technological diﬀerences. From a policy perspective, this suggests that promoting policies
that enhance technology transfers −like foreign direct investment− may be fundamental to fully enjoy the
beneﬁts of globalization.
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28APPENDIX 1
Consider the case of a technology-backward small open economy whose relative factor abundance k is
such that k<k x where kx is the factor intensity in labor-intensive industry x that would prevail if, at
international product prices, the domestic economy were to produce both goods. Figure A1 plots unit value
isoquants for goods x and y in the domestic economy at international product prices.
[Insert Figure A1]
Without international capital movements the domestic economy specializes in the production of x and
the domestic autarky return to capital depends upon the relative labor abundance of the domestic economy.
We can identify a level of k = e k −with e k being the capital-labor ratio such that r = r∗− that determines




, the domestic autarky return to capital
is lower than r∗, and hence capital market integration rises the domestic return to capital. The domestic
economy remains specialized in the production of good x, although it shifts toward a more labor-intensive
production technique due to higher relative capital costs. Production of the capital-intensive good y requires
a combination of tariﬀs and capital market distortions as discussed in the text. Intuitively, trade and
capital market integration remain substitutes as greater capital market distortions limit the convergence of
the domestic return to capital to r∗ and hence dampens the eﬀect on tariﬀs.
If k = e k there are no international diﬀerences in capital returns as the eﬀect of the technology gap on
the domestic autarky rental rate is exactly oﬀset by the higher labor abundance of the domestic economy.
This implies that the only available instrument for protecting industry y is a tariﬀ,a n dt h e r ei sn ot r a d e
oﬀ between trade and capital market distortions as only the former is available. The tariﬀ rate shifts the
unit value isoquant of good y toward the origin until A, and production of good y requires capital inﬂows
because k = e k.
Finally, if k belong to zone ii,i . e . ,k<e k, the domestic autarky rental rate is higher than r∗, meaning that
capital market integration leads to a fall in the domestic return to capital. The economy remains specialized
in the production of labor-intensive x, and trade and capital market distortions become complements because
29the latter, by impeding the downward convergence of the domestic return to capital to r∗,r i s et h et a r i ﬀ
requirements to protect industry y. Therefore, countries less integrated to world capital markets are also
countries less integrated to world product markets. However, an interior solution (partial capital and product
market integration) is never reached because capital market integration raises nominal income −both because
technology improves and also due to higher relative wages− and domestic consumer prices fall following lower
tariﬀ requirements. Therefore, countries choose full capital market integration and the tariﬀ rate is such
that the zero-proﬁt condition in industry y holds.
30Figure 1 - Panel A
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Figure 2: Lerner-Pearce Diagram 
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Figure 3: Optimal Level of Capital Market Integration 
Panel (a): Interior Solution Figure 4










Source: World Development Indicators and author's calculations
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Figure A1: Lerner-Pearce Diagram for Labor-abundant countries Table 1
Cross-Country Differences in Factor Prices: 1996
# country ω  se w/w* h*/h λ = r/r* k/k* τ (%)
1 AUT 1.14 1.24 1.291 1.136 1.287 1.077 8.08
2 BGR 1.18 2.64 0.047 19.64
3 BOL 0.39 0.07 0.078 1.767 0.352 0.067 9.83
4 CAN 1.00 0.45 0.908 1.070 0.976 1.096 10.01
5 CHL 0.42 0.05 0.296 1.393 0.975 0.344 10.95
6 CMR 0.85 1.47 0.106 2.353 0.293 0.035 20.64
7 COL 0.31 0.03 0.137 1.858 0.828 0.143 14.20
8 CRI 1.17 1.27 0.140 1.656 0.198 0.217 11.59
9 CYP 1.10 1.10 0.465 1.276 0.539 0.668 12.57
10 DNK 1.11 3.61 1.297 1.171 1.363 1.153 8.08
11 ECU 0.51 0.20 0.089 1.586 0.274 0.237 14.22
12 EGY 1.06 16.04 0.060 1.943 0.109 0.075 91.48
13 ESP 0.88 1.58 0.681 1.527 1.183 0.912 8.08
14 FIN 0.84 2.07 0.995 1.174 1.383 1.227 8.08
15 GBR 1.06 0.75 0.769 1.239 0.900 0.807 8.08
16 GRC 0.90 0.77 0.473 1.324 0.696 0.764 8.08
17 HKG 1.11 0.73 0.533 1.214 0.581 1.075 0.00
18 HUN 0.96 2.67 0.140 1.283 0.188 14.60
19 IDN 0.35 0.05 0.047 1.984 0.263 0.135 18.23
20 IND 0.78 0.56 0.042 1.958 0.105 0.053 35.07
21 IRL 1.00 1.59 0.960 1.259 1.212 0.895 8.08
22 JPN 0.55 0.09 1.081 1.205 2.354 1.194 4.98
23 KOR 0.48 0.03 0.547 1.153 1.307 0.907 9.57
24 LKA 0.38 0.05 0.025 1.692 0.112 0.082 28.59
25 MAC 18.71 7.52 0.187
26 MAR 1.12 0.78 0.132 0.148 22.60
27 MEX 0.44 0.09 0.167 1.567 0.595 0.442 14.31
28 MYS 0.72 0.16 0.154 1.377 0.295 0.497 11.47
29 NLD 1.13 0.98 1.342 1.245 1.479 1.086 8.08
30 NOR 1.19 2.79 1.115 1.025 0.962 1.610 4.98
31 NZL 1.16 3.92 0.572 1.061 0.522 0.858 6.84
32 PHL 0.53 0.09 0.099 1.422 0.266 0.122 24.13
33 POL 1.21 0.31 0.124 9.28
34 SGP 1.19 1.08 0.640 1.353 0.728 1.531
35 SWE 1.07 0.45 0.974 1.067 0.967 0.947 8.08
36 TUR 0.47 0.11 0.225 1.879 0.899 0.258 12.80
37 TWN 1.14 1.69 0.470 1.326 0.545 0.517 9.56
38 URY 1.34 0.48 0.223 1.488 0.248 0.277 12.95
39 USA 1.000 1.000 1.000 6.16
40 VEN 0.22 0.02 0.186 1.737 1.492 0.363 14.83
41 ZAF 0.97 2.23 0.307 1.322 0.417 0.261 13.69
Source: Caselli (2004), UNIDO, UNCTAD and author's calculations
Notes:
se: standard error of ω.
w/w*: Ratio of average manufacturing yearly wages per worker (Caselli, 2004)
h*/h: Ratio of US to each country's human capital from Caselli (2004)
λ = r/r*: rental ratio ratio after accounting for human capital differences computed as (w/w*)(h*/h)/w
k/k*: Ratio of 1990 capital per worker (Caselli, 2004)
τ: Average Manufacturing Tariffs from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001) (UNCTAD)Table 2
Sector-specific and average Technology Differences (1+δi)
3-digit ISIC Industry
# Country 311 313 314 321 322 323 324 331 332 341 342 351 352 353 354 355 356 361 362 369 371 372 381 382 383 384 385 390 (1+δ) T1 T2
1 AUT 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.76 1.67 1.61
2 BGR
3 BOL 3.54 3.48 2.13 4.10 3.88 4.16 4.03 4.40 4.63 3.90 4.16 3.47 3.55 3.47 3.90 4.24 4.00 4.32 3.93 4.15 4.18 4.12 4.37 4.21 3.85 4.17 4.06 4.21 3.95
4 CAN 1.17 1.17 0.75 1.07 1.11 1.06 1.13 1.05 1.13 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.03 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.82 1.79
5 CHL 1.27 1.26 0.77 1.45 1.38 1.48 1.43 1.56 1.63 1.40 1.49 1.25 1.28 1.25 1.40 1.51 1.43 1.53 1.40 1.48 1.49 1.47 1.55 1.53 1.39 1.49 1.45 1.50 1.41
6 CMR 4.10 4.30 2.81 3.98 4.17 4.13 4.26 4.52 4.67 4.00 4.10 3.69 3.95 3.80 4.05 4.37 4.16 4.40 4.21 4.31 4.01 4.00 4.25 4.00 4.08 4.05 4.09 4.50 4.11
7 COL 1.68 1.58 0.94 2.02 1.93 1.95 2.02 2.09 2.35 1.80 1.94 1.52 1.58 1.49 1.75 2.02 1.98 2.12 1.85 1.95 1.91 1.85 2.12 1.99 1.80 2.00 1.87 2.05 1.86 6.25 5.26
8 CRI 5.27 5.57 3.92 5.05 5.23 5.19 5.13 5.23 5.45 5.20 5.28 4.94 5.21 5.29 5.14 5.01 5.00 5.12 4.94 5.23 4.86 4.94 4.89 4.79 5.00 5.03 4.88 5.19 5.07
9 CYP 2.18 2.04 1.51 1.89 2.39 1.90 1.76 1.92 2.04 1.93 1.94 1.87 1.97 1.85 1.81 1.87 1.90 1.88 1.85 1.89 1.84 1.87 1.85 1.85 1.93 1.95 1.88 1.94 1.91
10 DNK 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.72
11 ECU 4.64 4.66 2.96 5.11 4.97 5.06 5.14 5.28 5.78 4.86 5.39 4.25 4.44 4.27 4.76 5.13 5.06 5.29 4.82 5.03 4.87 4.79 5.27 5.04 4.79 5.11 4.89 5.26 4.89
12 EGY 11.21 151.37 10.00 12.00 13.33 11.90 13.68 11.65 14.71 11.27 11.52 9.65 10.89 10.35 10.06 10.81 12.19 12.65 11.73 11.48 10.15 10.12 11.07 9.89 11.25 10.91 9.92 11.88 16.34
13 ESP 1.03 1.02 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.90 2.38 2.33
14 FIN 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.78 1.54 1.49
15 GBR 1.30 1.30 1.14 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.09 1.09 1.14 1.12 1.10 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.11 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.10 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.72 1.67
16 GRC 1.75 1.73 1.49 1.49 1.48 1.48 1.45 1.51 1.52 1.54 1.54 1.47 1.49 1.47 1.47 1.53 1.48 1.52 1.48 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.51 1.51 1.50 1.51 1.48 1.50 1.51 2.22 2.17
17 HKG 1.57 1.63 1.11 1.49 1.46 1.57 1.49 1.61 1.60 1.65 1.64 1.61 1.65 1.67 1.65 1.61 1.54 1.56 1.57 1.61 1.60 1.62 1.58 1.62 1.62 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.57 2.50 2.44
18 HUN 7.11 8.84 6.17 5.45 5.32 5.61 5.34 5.69 5.76 5.66 5.74 5.49 5.65 5.45 5.54 5.71 6.13 5.68 5.55 5.60 5.49 5.46 5.69 5.80 5.76 5.95 5.66 5.71 5.82 10.00 7.69
19 IDN 5.11 5.61 3.23 6.36 6.48 6.00 6.40 6.55 7.92 5.49 5.78 4.58 4.81 4.46 5.23 6.28 6.51 7.14 5.64 6.23 5.74 5.58 6.61 5.92 5.50 6.65 5.65 6.70 5.86
20 IND 12.06 21.50 8.78 13.20 12.95 11.86 13.27 13.39 14.61 12.40 12.38 12.25 12.79 12.62 12.82 14.15 12.75 13.73 13.57 13.99 12.94 12.75 13.20 12.60 12.98 13.22 12.78 13.54 13.18
21 IRL 0.98 0.97 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.84 1.82 1.79
22 JPN 0.51 0.52 0.31 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.51 1.43 1.41
23 KOR 1.00 1.04 0.72 1.00 0.96 1.01 0.99 1.07 1.12 0.98 1.00 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.98 1.05 0.99 1.06 0.98 1.03 1.03 1.00 1.07 1.06 0.98 1.03 1.01 1.04 1.00
24 LKA 13.21 12.60 20.21 14.93 15.09 14.76 15.60 14.79 18.13 13.63 13.91 11.07 11.77 11.50 12.71 15.20 14.10 16.04 13.50 14.93 13.42 13.24 15.26 13.97 13.14 15.00 13.63 15.00 14.30 11.11 14.29
25 MAC
26 MAR
27 MEX 2.14 2.17 1.37 2.44 2.41 2.44 2.50 2.66 2.75 2.24 2.40 2.02 2.14 2.03 2.27 2.53 2.44 2.61 2.37 2.49 2.40 2.36 2.61 2.44 2.30 2.48 2.37 2.52 2.35
28 MYS 3.59 4.27 2.25 4.07 4.07 3.96 4.42 4.40 4.82 4.08 4.15 3.52 3.67 3.55 3.76 4.54 4.32 4.27 4.16 4.23 3.97 3.85 4.21 3.88 3.92 4.22 3.70 4.07 4.00
29 NLD 0.78 0.78 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 1.39 1.37
30 NOR 0.96 0.97 0.67 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.02 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
31 NZL 1.81 1.90 1.29 1.71 2.03 1.83 1.91 1.86 1.96 1.96 1.90 1.80 1.88 1.88 1.90 1.89 1.87 1.84 1.78 1.87 1.82 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.91 1.87 1.79 1.85 1.85 2.63 2.63
32 PHL 5.17 5.65 3.60 5.59 5.50 5.91 6.44 6.04 6.33 5.23 5.53 4.45 4.81 4.35 5.17 5.70 5.66 6.19 5.25 5.78 5.24 5.22 5.88 5.25 5.11 5.29 5.22 5.76 5.40
33 POL
34 SGP 1.24 1.29 0.88 1.16 1.14 1.22 1.15 1.25 1.24 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.30 1.32 1.30 1.25 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.23 1.26 1.27 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.23 2.08 2.04
35 SWE 1.21 1.20 1.06 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.75 1.72
36 TUR 1.48 1.62 1.32 1.50 1.47 1.59 1.71 1.56 1.69 1.45 1.50 1.30 1.31 1.26 1.40 1.50 1.50 1.67 1.44 1.48 1.51 1.47 1.61 1.52 1.42 1.52 1.47 1.55 1.49
37 TWN 2.03 2.38 1.78 1.70 1.74 1.73 1.65 1.74 1.82 1.84 1.80 1.77 1.83 1.84 1.81 1.85 1.71 1.83 1.80 1.83 1.80 1.75 1.81 1.79 1.83 1.88 1.75 1.77 1.82
38 URY 3.97 4.39 3.06 3.83 3.87 3.91 3.88 3.86 4.06 4.12 3.99 3.93 4.13 3.91 3.89 4.06 3.95 3.95 3.91 3.94 3.90 3.85 3.94 3.67 4.01 3.79 3.90 4.07 3.92 9.09 4.55
39 USA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
40 VEN 0.97 0.94 0.56 1.24 1.17 1.19 1.24 1.28 1.47 1.06 1.24 0.88 0.91 0.85 1.03 1.22 1.19 1.31 1.10 1.17 1.16 1.11 1.30 1.21 1.06 1.21 1.12 1.24 1.12
41 ZAF 2.60 2.73 2.11 3.02 3.80 2.65 2.80 2.64 2.88 2.56 2.62 2.37 2.48 2.37 2.53 2.68 2.61 2.62 2.45 2.44 2.42 2.41 2.49 2.42 2.49 2.55 2.34 2.46 2.59
Source: Author's estimations and Trefler (1995)
(1+δ): Unweighted average of (1+δ1i)
T1: Neutral technological differences model (Trefler, 1995)
T2: Unrestricted model (Trefler, 1995)Table 3
Tariffs and Capital Market Integration: 1996
Dependent Variable (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ)
Constant 1.169 1.189 0.890 0.910 0.970 0.961
0.017 0.025 0.051 0.064 0.033 0.040
λ -0.065 -0.093 -0.005 0.009
0.019 0.038 0.015 0.034
(1+δ) 0.015 0.016
0.003 0.004
λ ∗ (1+δ) 0.197 0.186 0.096 0.094
0.042 0.052 0.029 0.040
Adjusted R
2 0.242 0.169 0.383 0.333 0.788 0.751
Sample 35 25 34 25 34 25
Restrictions None δ>0 None δ>0 None δ>0
Notes: 
Standard errors in italics
All estimations exclude Egypt, but none of them is affected by its exclusionTable 4
Cross-country Differences in Tariffs
Productivity and Factor Abundance Effects
λ and δ correct for Human Capital Differences
Dependent Variable (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ) (1+τ)* (1+τ)*
Constant 1.195 1.204 0.968 0.970 0.968 1.060 0.965 1.129
0.014 0.018 0.079 0.100 0.079 0.102 0.078 0.098
k/k* -0.119 -0.154 -0.026 -0.048 0.036 -0.232 0.105 -0.027
0.019 0.033 0.035 0.050 0.144 0.248 0.078 0.228
(1+δ) · λ 0.175 0.186 0.203 0.159 0.206 0.115
0.060 0.075 0.061 0.075 0.060 0.075
(1+δ) · λ
2
-0.042 -0.059 -0.080 -0.144 -0.073 -0.119
0.018 0.026 0.027 0.040 0.024 0.039
k/k* · (1+δ) · λ -0.132 -0.032 -0.204 -0.290
0.150 0.240 0.079 0.196
k/k* · (1+δ) · λ
2
0.074 0.289 0.072 0.299
0.029 0.099 0.028 0.104
Adjusted R
2 0.533 0.473 0.605 0.570 0.662 0.675 0.670 0.642
Sample 34 24 33 24 33 24 33 24
Restrictions None δ>0 None δ>0 None δ>0 None δ>0
Standard errors in italics
All estimations exclude Egypt, but none of them is affected by its exclusion
* Coefficient and standard errors of k/k* (1+δ) λ2    are computed using Delta MethodTable 5
Factor Endowments and Productivity
Dependent Variable k/k* k/k*
Constant 1.935 1.670
0.222 0.231










Standard Errors in Italics